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Abstract-A Mobile Ad hoc Network is a group of wireless 
mobile computers in which nodes cooperate by forwarding 
packets to each other allowing them to communicate beyond 
direct wireless transmission range. Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
(MANET) has become an exciting and important technology in 
recent years because of the rapid proliferation of wireless 
devices. Security is an important issue for all kinds of networks 
including the Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In this paper, we are 
presenting some of the reasons that have made MANETs more 
vulnerable to attacks than the traditional wired network. This 
paper also covers the security attributes and the various 
challenges to security design. This paper shreds light on some 
of the security attacks that exists in MANETs. This Paper also 
proposes Trust Based Security Architecture for MANET. 
Index Term-sBlackhole attacks, DoS and Flooding, 
Eavesdropping, Grayhole attacks, Impersonation, MANETs 
(Mobile Ad hoc Networks), Rushing, Wormhole attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ANET is a collection of independent mobile nodes 
that can communicate to each other via radio waves. 
The mobile nodes that are in radio range of each other can 
directly communicate whereas others need the aid of 
intermediate nodes to route their packets. These networks 
are fully distributed and can work at any place without the 
help of any infrastructure. The system may operate in 
isolation, or may have gateways to interface with a fixed 
network. This property makes MANET highly robust. The 
characteristics of these networks are summarized below:  
Autonomous and Infrastructure-less  
Dynamic Network Topology 
Self-organization and Self-administration 
No Centralized controller and Infrastructure: 
Intrinsic Mutual Trust 
Device Heterogeneity 
Bandwidth-Constrained  
Energy-Constrained Operation  
Multi-hop Routing 
Network Scalability 
Nodes can be both host or router 
Frequent Routing updates 
Limited Physical Security 
__________________________ 
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II. SECURITY PROBLEMS IN MANET 
Security is one of the important issues for wired networks as 
well as for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. MANETs are much 
more vulnerable to attacks than the wired networks due to 
system constraints in mobile devices which include low-
power, open medium, dynamically changing network 
topology, cooperative algorithms, lack of centralized 
monitoring and low battery power.  The unique 
characteristics of MANETs present a new set of nontrivial 
challenges to security design which includes open network 
architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource 
constraints, highly dynamic network topology and some 
more. Some of the important ones are discussed below: 
1) Open Medium: Eavesdropping is much easier in 
wireless networks than in wired networks. 
2) Dynamically changing Network Topology: Mobile 
nodes come and go from network thereby allowing 
any malicious node to join the network without 
being detected. 
3) Cooperative Algorithms: The routing algorithm of 
MANET requires mutual trust between nodes 
which violates the principle of network security. 
4) Lack of Centralized Monitoring: Absence of any 
Centralized Infrastructure prohibits any monitoring 
agents in the system. 
5) Lack of Clear Line of Defense: The line of 
Defense i.e. prevention, Detection and Response 
are needed. Security research in wired networks 
needs to deploy layered security mechanism 
because security is a process that is as secure as its 
weakest link. 
III. SECURITY ATTRIBUTES 
Security has become a primary concern in order to 
provide protected communication between mobile 
nodes in a hostile environment and the ultimate goal of 
the security solutions for MANETs is to provide 
security services such as Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability, Non-Repudiation and Authentication, 
Authorization and Anonymity.  
1) Confidentiality ensures that Secret information or 
data is never disclosed to unauthorized devices. 
2) Integrity tells that a received message is not 
corrupted.  
3) Availability permits the survivability of 
network services despite Denial-of-Service 
attacks.  
M
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4) Non-repudiation ensures that the sender of a 
message cannot deny having sent the message.  
5) Authentication enables a node to ensure the 
identity of the Peer node it is communicating 
with. 
6) Authorization is a process in which an entity is 
issued a credential, which specifies the 
privileges and permissions it has and cannot be 
falsified, by the certificate authority. 
Anonymity ensures that the information used to 
identify the owner or the current user of the node 
should default be kept private and not be 
distributed by the node itself or the System 
Software. 
IV. Security Challenges 
1) Channel Vulnerability: Broadcast Wireless 
channels allow message Eavesdropping and 
Injection easily. 
2) Node Vulnerability: Nodes do not reside in 
physically protected places, thus easily fall under 
attack. 
3) Absence of Infrastructure: Certification/ 
Authentication Authorities are absent. 
4) Dynamically Changing Network Topology puts 
security of routing protocols under threat. 
5) Power and Computational Limitations prevent the 
use of complex Encryption Algorithms. 
V. SECURITY ATTACKS 
MANETs vulnerabilities and lacks give rise to attacks at 
network layer of ISO/OSI stack. There are basically two 
types of attacks: Active and Passive. In an active attack, 
information is inserted to the network and thus the network 
operation or some nodes may be harmed. Examples are 
Impersonation, Modification, Fabrication and Disclosure 
attack. Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of 
damaging other nodes by causing network outage are 
considered to be malicious. In a passive attack, a malicious 
node either ignores operations supposed to be accomplished 
by it (examples: silent discard, partial routing information 
hiding), or listens to the channel, attempting to retrieve 
valuable information (example: vesdropping). Nodes that 
perform passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life 
for their own communications are considered to be selfish. 
In this paper, we are discussing some of the active attacks 
given below: 
1) Impersonation 
An Act whereby one Entity assumes the identity and 
privileges of another Entity without restrictions and without 
any indication visible to the recipients of the impersonator's 
calls that delicately has taken place as shown in Fig 5.1. 
2) Blackhole attacks:  
A Blackhole is a malicious node that falsely replies for route 
requests without having an active route to the destination 
and exploits the Routing Protocol to advertise itself as 
having a good and valid path to a destination node. As 
shown in Fig 5.2, a malicious node tries to become an 
element of an active route, if there is a chance and it has bad 
intention of disrupting data packets being sent to the 
destination node or obstructing the route discovery process.   
3) Grayhole attacks:  
A Grayhole may forward all packets to certain nodes but 
may drop packets coming from or destined to specific nodes 
as shown in Fig 5.3. In this type of attack, node may behave 
maliciously for some time but later on it behaves absolutely 
normally. This type of attacks is more difficult compared to 
black hole attack. 
 
 
4) Wormhole attacks  
In a wormhole attack, a malicious node can record packets 
(or bits) at one location in the network and tunnel them to 
another location through a private network shared with a 
colluding malicious node. Wormhole attack can be done 
with one node also, but generally two or more attackers 
connect via a link called wormhole link. Wormhole attack is 
of three types: Closed Wormhole, Half Open Wormhole, 
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and Open Wormhole. All of these have been shown in Fig 
5.4. 
5) Rushing 
When a neighbor of the target receives the rushed 
REQUEST from the attacker, it forwards that REQUEST, 
and will not forward any further REQUESTs from this 
Route Discovery. When non-attacking REQUESTs arrive 
later at these nodes, they will discard these legitimate 
REQUESTs as shown in Fig 5.5. 
 
 
 
6) Eavesdropping 
 Eavesdropping is another kind of attack that usually 
happens in the Mobile Ad hoc Networks and is shown in Fig 
5.6. The goal of eavesdropping is to obtain some 
confidential information that should be kept secret during 
the communication. This confidential information may 
include the location, public key, private key or even 
passwords of the nodes. Because such data are very 
important to the security state of the nodes, it should be kept 
away from unauthorized access. 
7) DoS and Flooding 
In a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to 
prevent legitimate users from accessing information or 
services. By targeting client computer and its network 
connection, or the computers and network of the sites client 
is trying to use, an attacker may be able to prevent the client 
from accessing email, websites, online accounts, or other 
services that rely on the affected computer. The most 
common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when an 
attacker floods a network with information as shown in Fig 
5.7. When client types a URL for a particular website into 
browser, the server can only process a certain number of 
requests at once, so if an attacker overloads the server with 
requests, it can't process the legitimate request. 
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VI. TRUST BASED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR MANET 
 
Since in MANETs, there is no centralized authority for trust 
relationship between the nodes to communicate, this Paper 
proposes a Security Architecture for the secure transmission 
of data between MANET nodes named Trust Based Security 
Architecture for MANET. The objective of the architecture 
presented in this paper is to provide security in a 
Collaborative, Self-organized manner. It provides tolerance 
to compromised nodes, have the ability to detect and remove 
adversaries from network and handle routing misbehaviors. 
The model defined in our architecture differs from related 
models [1] and [2, 3] by defending against both Flooding 
and Packet drop attacks as is shown in fig 6.1.The Trust 
Infrastructure module corresponds to the trust relationship 
between nodes to communicate and it has various security 
mechanisms that are constructed in a distributed manner and 
are the basic building blocks of the entire security system. 
Communications Security module refers to the secure 
transmission of data from one node to another.Since Routing 
is an important part for a network so every node should 
participate in routing activity and thus leads to network 
topology so that the data packets can be routed to the correct 
destination. Routing Security refers to security 
corresponding to Routing Protocols. The Routing Security is 
categorized into two parts: Secure Routing and Secure data 
forwarding. In Secure Routing, a node cooperate to have 
correct routing information and thus keeps the network 
connected efficiently and in Secure Data Forwarding, data 
packets, while on the route, should be protected from 
tampering, dropping, and altering by any unauthorized 
party.The secure routing protocol is responsible to discover 
secure paths and to have secure data transmission through 
the secret associations established and maintained by the 
key management mechanism. 
 
In this architecture, the Secure Routing Protocol forwards 
evidence for fabrication and modification attacks to the 
Trust Infrastructure module, and takes advantage of the 
Trust Infrastructure module feedback to make better routing 
decisions. Although the Key Management Mechanism [8] 
does not forward any evidence to Trust Infrastructure 
module, it relies heavily on its feedback to dynamically 
manage the keys. Network Security refers to the security 
mechanisms used by the network protocols which perform 
sub-network access operations from end system to end 
system. Secure Message Transmission [3] working at 
network security is a good example of security efforts done 
in the end systems as a remedy for the unreliable routing 
protocol. End-to-End Security refers to end system security. 
The security protocols at this level is independent of the 
underlying networking technology since the related security 
mechanisms are restricted to only intended parties. In 
sequence, this model is used to defend against both flooding 
and packet drop attacks. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
MANETs require a reliable, efficient, scalable and most 
importantly, a secure protocol as they are highly insecure, 
self-organizing, rapidly deployed and they use dynamic 
routing. In this paper, we discussed the vulnerable nature of 
the mobile ad hoc network, and owe to that; there are 
numerous security threats that disturb the development of it. 
This paper also covers the security attributes and the various 
challenges to security design.  This paper also presents the 
security issues. Then it presents the main attack types that 
exist in it. This Paper has focused on designing security 
architecture in tackling security challenges that mobile ad 
hoc networks are facing. In this paper, we have proposed 
Trust Based Security Architecture for MANETs. We expect 
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this security architecture can be used as a framework when 
designing system security for ad hoc networks. 
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